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ABSTRACT 
In 2007 Ivan Krastev argued that EU-enforced ‘liberal consensus’ in East Central Europe was 
giving way to illiberal, but ultimately benign, populism. Post-accession ‘backsliding’ in 
Hungary suggests a stronger illiberal challenge. However, we argue, democratic malaise in 
ECE is better understood as a long-term pattern of ‘illiberal consolidation’ built on an 
accommodation between technocratic, economistic liberalism and forces of rent-seeking and 
cultural conservatism. This configuration generates a mirage of liberal-democratic progress 
and mainstream moderate politics, which obscures engrained elite collusion and limits to 
cultural change. Bulgarian-style hollowness, rather than Hungarian-style semi-
authoritarianism, better exemplifies the potential fate of ECE democracies today. 
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In 2007 Ivan Krastev wrote an influential article in the Journal of Democracy entitled ‘The 
Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus’. His essay was part of a special issue which wondered 
aloud, for the first time, whether democracy was backsliding across East Central Europe.1 The 
arguments he presented were initially alarming, but ultimately soothing. Yes, the rise of 
illiberal populism across the region signaled that the post-1989 ‘consensual politics’ aimed at 
EU accession were coming to an end. No, this was not a dangerous situation threatening a 
collapse of democracy as unlike the inter-war period, democracy had no serious ideological 
alternative.  “Weimar interpretations” were wide of the mark: “The streets of Budapest and 
Warsaw today are not flooded by paramilitary formations in search of a final solution, but by 
restless consumers in search of a final sale”2.  
Krastev was broadly correct about the limited threat of far right illiberal populism. 
Paramilitary formations chanting nationalist and anti-Semitic slogans may have joined the 
shoppers in Hungarian towns and cities, but Hungary’s slide towards semi-authoritarianism is 
arguably an exceptional case reflecting a specific combination of a restive conservative-
nationalist right-wing, strongly majoritarian institutions and economic recession. Even after 
years of socio-economic pain and occasional political turbulence following the Great 
Recession of 2008-9, the bigger picture in both East Central Europe and more widely reveals 
that ‘Weimar Europe’ has not come to pass3.  
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Yet if Krastev was right that democracy in East Central Europe was not about to go out with a 
bang, he failed to consider the possibility that it might go out with a whimper. In stressing the 
limited threat posed by extremist outsider parties and elected strongmen, Krastev failed to 
consider a subtler threat; that illiberalism, represented both by entrenched economic elites 
and latent forces of national and social conservatism, had never actually gone away during 
the period of ‘liberal consensus’ and was thus already established in the mainstream.   
The liberalism of the ‘liberal consensus’ – as Krastev’s essay freely concedes – was an elite 
project driven by small groups at the apex of politics, business, academia and officialdom. 
However, we argue in this paper that this narrow economistic, technocratic variant of 
liberalism merged with existing illiberal narratives and interests that pro-European elites 
generally opted to accommodate, rather than oppose. Despite appearances there is an 
absence of genuinely liberal political platforms – by which we understand a range of 
mainstream ideologies of both left and right based on shared commitments to norms of 
political equality, individual liberty, civic tolerance and the rule of law - leaving citizens lacking 
exposure to the philosophical rationale underpinning liberal democratic institutions. Across 
the region from Poland to Bulgaria, it is this configuration that sees ardently pro-European 
administrations of both center-left and center-right steadily undermining liberal democracy. 
Region-wide backsliding as the flip-side of conditionality 
The idea that democracy is backsliding in East Central Europe is fast becoming the consensus 
view among observers of the region. Much of the backsliding literature understandably 
focuses on Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, who has stripped away formal checks and balances to 
concentrate power in his own hands 4  and seeks support on the basis of an exclusivist 
nationalism underlined by his unabashed declaration that he will build an ‘illiberal nation-
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state’5. Elsewhere in the region, however, mainstream politicians have taken the opportunity 
of big electoral majorities to bend democratic and constitutional rules. Barely had the 
constraints of EU conditionality been lifted when Bulgarian and Romanian administrations, 
moved to vandalize their countries’ institutions and reward financial insiders6. Even in a 
democratic high-achiever like the Czech Republic, in 2013 the country’s first directly elected 
president, former social democratic Prime Minister Miloš Zeman, wasted no time trying to 
bend the constitution into a semi-presidential system, appointing a technocratic government 
over the heads of the country’s political parties7.  
Viewed in the context of a decade of quantified data provided by Freedom House’s Nations 
in Transit, such episodes can be seen as part of an established region-wide trend of backsliding 
on democracy. Measured along a scale in which a score of 1 denotes ‘highest level of 
democratic progress’ and 7 the lowest, Hungary and Slovakia have regressed spectacularly 
since EU accession, each falling from mid-2000s highs of 1.96 to current lows of 2.96 and 2.61 
respectively (Freedom House Nations in Transit 2014). Poland was listed even higher, at 1.75 
on the eve of accession in 2004, yet it too has regressed to 2.18. Romania and Bulgaria, 
countries recently seen as ‘successful laggards’8, have regressed from highs of 3.29 and 2.86 
to present lows of 3.46 and 3.25. Only the Czech Republic appeared to buck this trend, until 
it too fell heavily from 2.14 in 2013 to 2.25 in 2014. Hungary aside, these figures do not 
suggest headlong descent into semi-authoritarianism.  However, they do suggest that the idea 
of a democratic malaise in the region is more than mere hyperbole. 
Yet this did not come as a nasty surprise. Backsliding was a widely forecast side-effect of the 
elite-focused, incentive-driven democratization and reform in ECE implemented under the 
oversight of the EU. Just as prevailing explanations of the success of democratization had 
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focused on the incentives for elites to meet EU conditionalities, warnings of possible 
backsliding focused on the likely impact of the disappearance of these incentives post-
accession 9 . In line with much later analysis of backsliding, such warnings rested on the 
assumptions that ECE elites had not internalized liberal-democratic values and would violate 
or stretch constitutional norms when able to do so. Now that the expected trend of 
backsliding has emphatically emerged, scholarship has moved on to consider cross-national 
variation in the forms and extent of backsliding and how elites could be coerced or ‘shamed’ 
into preserving liberal institutions.10 It nevertheless continues to place considerable faith in 
(international and domestic) institutions and incentives to stop them doing so.  
The Illusion of Democratic Consolidation 
Despite the coherence – and to some extent realism - of these accounts, their understanding 
of democratic consolidation and progress as a function of elite calculation rather than 
identification has always been in conflict with the equally taken-for-granted notion that 
‘democracy needs democrats’ and the only slightly more contested idea that ‘democracy 
needs democratic citizens’.11  ECE democracies’ low levels of civic engagement and weakly 
embedded institutions have long been noted, usually framed as tough, but surmountable, 
obstacles thrown up by the legacies of communism12.  Only a small number of scholars have 
flagged the more acute challenge that such institutional hollowness poses to institutionally-
focused models of democratization. For example, Bohle & Greskovits note that, unlike 
Western Europe with its well-established, if declining, core of mass civic and political 
engagement, ECE democracies were born with a ‘hollow core’ 13  and suggest that such 
hollowness is key to understanding region’s democratic malaise.  
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Considering this hollowness, it would thus have taken a great deal of principled and 
philosophically-consistent political leadership and civic activism to make meaningful 
identification with core liberal democratic norms even possible. Despite the presence of many 
self-proclaimed ‘liberals’ in mainstream politics, no political-cultural project was ever 
attempted on a scale sufficient to embed liberal norms and practices in contexts were they 
had previously been absent. Far from backsliding on limited earlier progress, East Central 
Europe’s democratic consolidation is thus better viewed as somewhat illusory in the first 
place.  
Furthermore, the story of ECE democracy is not simply one of hollow institutions subject to 
the occasional predations of newly disinhibited illiberal elites while a minority of genuine 
liberals looks on. The political center ground across East Central Europe, has long been 
characterized by the subtle cohabitation of liberal and illiberal norms, with the latter gradually 
overpowering the former. It is this consistent weakness of liberalism, we believe, that lies at 
the root of the region’s democratic malaise, with the well-documented problems of fading 
conditionalities, corruption and economic crisis serving as opportunity structures for both 
elites seeking to consolidate their power and angry citizens seeking to vent their frustrations. 
Much analysis has identified Hungary as the paradigmatic case of (semi-)authoritarian 
backsliding in ECE expressing, in metastasized form, the ‘same cancer… present elsewhere on 
the continent, even if it hasn't come to the attention of diagnosticians’14. However, if our 
analysis is correct, it is another ECE state that is more paradigmatic of the malaise afflicting 
the region’s hollow, incomplete democracies: Bulgaria. Although disadvantaged by lower 
levels of economic development and less favorable historical legacies and always seen as 
deeply flawed, Bulgarian democracy was widely seen as one of the success stories of EU 
democratic conditionality and was not infrequently labeled ‘consolidated’ 15 . It also 
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exemplified in stark form political dynamics characteristic of successful democratizing states 
elsewhere in ECE. While in much of ECE the picture of top-down, elite-dominated 
democratization was blurred by weak or ambiguous liberal traditions and legacies of 
opposition to communist rule, Bulgarian pre-accession democratization was an unabashedly 
elite-driven process16. 
In Bulgaria we see liberalism – or rather the economistic and technocratic variant of it that 
emerged post-1989 - merge with existing illiberal narratives (ethnic nationalism, social 
conservatisms) which pro-European elites generally opted to accommodate rather than to 
oppose. Thus Bulgaria’s pro-western reform-oriented Union of Democratic Forces-led 
government of 1997-2001, usually credited with putting the country firmly on the path to 
democratic consolidation 17 , never actually advocated liberal norms beyond the bare 
minimum required by a European Union keen to recognize a prospective new member18. UDF 
PM Ivan Kostov may have overseen Bulgaria’s ratification of the Framework Convention on 
the Protection of National Minorities, but he was keen to stress the party’s ‘national 
credentials’ on the campaign trail19. Predictably, the party never seriously threatened to 
repeal the illiberal constitutional prohibition on parties ‘formed on an ethnic basis’. 20 
Similarly, though the UDF’s liberal economic policies (and especially its implementation of a 
currency board) aligned with the prescriptions of Western governments and financial 
institutions, the enthusiasm of the latter was tempered by the party’s penchant for 
‘privatizing in their own favor’21. The UDF, though undoubtedly a massive improvement on 
the brazenly corrupt Bulgarian Socialist Party administration that preceded them in office, is 
thus better understood as an ECE government neither excessively progressive nor regressive: 
hardly the transformative force to realize a fully liberal democracy in a political-cultural sense.  
7 
 
What the UDF did achieve was to usher in a period of broad elite-level consensus in favor of 
building liberal institutions with a view to Euro-Atlantic integration; a feat that would certainly 
have been hugely more difficult if it had articulated these goals as part of a strongly 
progressive liberal platform. Bulgaria accordingly made rapid progress in implementing liberal 
institutions as reflected in Freedom House Nations in Transit’s grading of the country as a 
‘consolidated democracy’ by 2006 22  and, more consequentially, by its admission to the 
European Union in 2007.  
The post-accession period in Bulgaria witnessed no autocratic Fidesz-style power grab, nor 
even any major electoral breakthrough for far-right populists. The country is barely 
mentioned in much of the backsliding literature. Yet the democratic norms enshrined in the 
country’s institutions were nonetheless undermined in a more piecemeal, pragmatic manner. 
The ruling tripartite coalition led by the Bulgarian Socialist Party quickly fell afoul of the EU on 
corruption and connived with parliamentary allies to tamper with the electoral rules in 200923. 
Though the gambit failed and allowed the new pro-European center-right GERB party to win 
the 2009 election and install celebrity Mayor of Sofia Boiko Borissov as PM, the change of 
government did nothing to arrest the steady decline in the country’s NiT Democracy Score24. 
One relatively obscure incident speaks volumes about GERB’s flexible approach to both EU 
regulations and democratic norms: In 2011, GERB Interior Minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov tried 
to maintain the practice of funding the country’s police force from private donations 
(amounting to several million euros per month) even after censure from the European 
Commission25. GERB’s ascendance ultimately only meant that a different set of elites oversaw 
the erosion of institutional checks and balances. 
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However, the fact that such flagrant post-accession abuses elicited limited intellectual and 
public dissent reveals that institutional vandalism is a symptom rather than the cause of this 
malaise. The underlying problem is that illiberal elites can only weakly be held to account by 
citizens who have never been exposed to any unambiguously liberal identity project. This was 
demonstrated by the aftermath of the generally hopeful waves of mass protest that targeted 
first GERB and then BSP-led governments throughout 2013.  
The second wave protests - centered on Sofia and backed by most of the intelligentsia – 
clearly embraced some liberal norms, lampooning the oligarchic linkages of the BSP-led 
government with a creative protest repertoire. However the movement’s ideological 
underpinnings echoed the UDF-era formula of advocating ‘Europe’ and ‘democracy’ while 
neglecting and often seeking to delegitimize the interests of disadvantaged sections of 
society26. The familiar absence of any call for a more inclusive political community also meant 
that the long-standing tolerance for ethnic particularism among the country’s right-leaning 
liberals was left unchallenged, leaving behind a barely altered political landscape. The 
Reformist bloc, which includes the UDF’s successor parties and draws support from the same 
highly-educated urban demographic driving the protests, has thus used its position in the 
post-October 2014 GERB-led government to target Roma for discrimination 27 . Bulgaria’s 
‘liberal consensus’ continues to unravel not because of far-right or conservative intrusion but 
because it was illusory in the first place.  
Seen in this light, the experience of Bulgaria as a ‘successful laggard’ underlines how the very 
premise that liberal democracy was ever as institutionalized as the EU’s accession judgements 
suggested is very much open to question. Moreover, we would argue, it is open to question 
not only for ‘laggards’, but even for apparently successful and high-performing Central 
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European Visegrad states. If the ‘liberal consensus’ underpinning democratization was illusory, 
as our argument holds, then democracy in the region may instead be moving towards a kind 
of equilibrium in which liberal-democratic institutions are gradually eroded as the illiberalism 
of the political mainstream discreetly consolidates. Viewed in this perspective, Bulgaria might 
not actually be a ‘laggard’ at all. It could actually be a trailblazer representing a ‘purer’, more 
‘consolidated’ form that the region is moving towards. 
The Illiberal Parameters of Mainstream Politics in Central Europe 
This pattern, expressed most strikingly in the ‘Bulgarian scenario’, is rooted in the interaction 
of a compromised form of liberalism with residual illiberal structures inherent to post-
communist societies. However, these same conditions are evident to varying degrees across 
ECE, leaving even relatively high performing states such as Czech Republic and even Poland 
vulnerable to a creeping illiberal consolidation of politics facilitated rather than blocked by 
the ‘ersatz liberalism’ of the political mainstream.   
 As Krastev’s account makes plain, ECE liberalism not only rested on a narrow social base, but 
was also drawn narrowly in intellectual terms. The only clear philosophical threads that linked 
the projects of liberal elites from Warsaw to Sofia in the late 1990s and early 2000s were 
Euro-Atlantic foreign policy orientations and conformity with the liberal economic recipes of 
the World Bank, the IMF and the acquis communautaire. This threadbare, ersatz liberalism 
side-lined emancipatory concerns relating to traditionally marginalized constituencies, 
thereby allowing ‘reforming’ elites to avoid confrontation with existing bases of illiberal 
power in society.  Such bastions of illiberalism have been twofold: 1) economic elites with 
origins in, but not confined to, nomenklatura structures and 2) well established, but not 
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necessarily dominant or assertive, forces of national and social conservatism found in sections 
of the intelligentsia, churches and nationalist subcultures. 
By this interpretation, it is exactly this lack of commitment to liberal democratic norms from 
the outwardly pro-democratic political mainstream, including small, avowedly liberal parties, 
that explains the growth of illiberal power in ECE politics and society  - of which institutional 
‘backsliding’ is a mere symptom.  
At the same time, it is important to stress that these remain competitive democratic systems 
with a landscape of institutions and parties modelled along West European lines, albeit 
increasingly undermined by popular distrust, corrupt collusive relationships between 
business, media and political elites and periodic eruptions of civic anger and anti-elite 
populism. Just as significantly, however, they are characterized by a revealing lack of public 
discussion and civic activism around touchstone social issues, such as the condition of the 
Roma or LGBT rights, or substantive, informed debate on the political power of economic 
elites. These silences and gaps set de facto limits on the scope of liberal democracy.  
There are, even leaving aside the case of Hungary, important variations in the patterns 
democratic development unfolding across the Visegrad group. However, our purpose here is 
not to highlight these variations but rather to argue that all three of the seemingly 
democratically robust (but divergent) Visegrad democracies - the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and even Poland – bear key hallmarks of the pattern of illiberal consolidation exemplified by 
Bulgaria. 
Czech Republic 
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The Czech Republic, a consistently high achiever for democratic progress, provides a good 
example of a society in which there are few structural obstacles to the realization of a fully 
liberal democracy. Czech nationalism has always self-consciously embraced ideas of political 
and economic liberalism28  and there is no obvious clash between national identity and liberal 
democracy. Furthermore, there was an activist sub-culture dating from the early 1990s – with 
roots in the dissident movement of 1970s and 80s - that did advocate broader, more 
emancipatory imaginings of liberalism29. Unlike many new EU members, the country also had 
a stable line-up of plausible ‘standard’ parties (Social Democrats, Christian Democrat, pro-
market conservatives, Communists) competing, at least until 2010, over socio-economic 
issues. Since then, this left-right axis has been weakened by the emergence of business-
backed protest parties, notionally animated by good governance and anti-corruption 
agendas, rather than illiberal populism. 
However, the strength of the country’s parties and the fixation of its politics on economic 
growth and (later) well-functioning institutions also reveal the limitations and underlying 
weakness of its democracy. As President Havel often warned in the 1990s, the early 
consolidation of political parties took place at the price of damming and demobilizing civic 
activism, whose limited impact on Czech society was reinforced by a turn to project-driven 
NGO building (often in a sub-contracting role for the EU) rather than any alternative Czech 
identity project. The unhealthy merger of political and economic spheres – and the 
penetration of business interests into NGOs and the third sector - has been a consistent 
feature of Czech democracy. This has recently been thrown into sharp relief by the political 
rise of billionaire Andrej Babiš who combines a substantial business and media empire with 
an extensive role in government as deputy prime minister and finance minister. Babiš has 
shown an astute ability to co-opt anti-corruption and good governance NGOs into the service 
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of his notionally reformist ANO movement, while simultaneously drawing large numbers of 
former secret policeman into his political entourage.30 However, the Czech post-communist 
liberal project has always been rooted in compromise:  firstly of dissident liberals with the 
economistic liberalism of technocratic elites31 and secondly of emerging mainstream parties 
and politicians with the economic elites rooted in the old regime, who became the backbone 
of the domestic business class.32  
Despite the country’s hallowed liberal nationalist traditions, the absence of a strong 
progressive civil society means it is not difficult to find the limits of Czech liberalism on issues 
of inclusive citizenship and national identity. The post-war re-foundation of the Czechoslovak 
state on the basis of the mass ‘transfer’ of ethnic Germans remains taboo as a topic of real 
debate within mainstream politics.33 Although Czech public opinion has become more liberal 
towards some minorities (for example, lesbians and gay men), Roma are the subject of 
engrained public hostility and – with the exception of hostile outbursts by local populists and 
individuals (usually from mainstream parties) – are largely invisible in political debate.  
Although the populist radical right seems likely to remain marginal electorally, a string of 
grassroots protests in 2011 highlighted that ‘anti-Gypsyism’ is far from a latent phenomenon. 
Slovakia 
The Slovakian case reveals progressive liberalism to be even more elusive. Unlike the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia is widely viewed as having turned to liberal-democratic politics after an 
initial period of illiberal post-transition backsliding. From 1992, a strong illiberal nationalist 
ruling party (HZDS under Vladimír Mečiar) and smaller radical right parties were able to 
scapegoat the Hungarian minority and focus on anxieties around the vulnerability of Slovakia 
as a newly independent state. When HDZS were displaced in 1998 by a pro-European coalition 
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of ‘standard’ parties extending from Christian Democrats to post-communist social 
democrats, the country started its rapid climb towards EU membership. The political system 
appeared to ‘normalize’ around left-right competition as Smer, having emerged under the 
leadership of Robert Fico, reinvented itself as form of social democracy. As in the Czech 
Republic, such ‘standard’ party-political divisions have recently started to be eroded by the 
politics of anti-corruption and good governance. This could be seen most visibly in the ‘Gorilla’ 
protests of early 2012 over leaked wire-tap transcripts implicating major parties in systematic 
corruption of privatization in 2005-6, as well as in the rise of liberal protest parties such as 
Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) (2010) and Ordinary People (OL’aNO).  
However, the focus of the liberal anti-Mečiarism of 1990s was on catching up with ‘Europe’ 
and implementing the acquis (legislation, institution-building) while the liberals who took 
office when center-right parties gained office after 1998 focused on neo-liberal welfare and 
labor market reforms34. The capture of liberal post- Mečiar privatization projects by informal 
economic structures has already been noted. 
Unsurprisingly, however, there is very little evidence that any of the country’s political parties 
- or the bulk of it citizens - had seriously rejected illiberal norms. Smer was able to absorb the 
nationalist camp electorally and to some extent also ideologically by fusing elements of ethnic 
nationalism with a populist understanding of social democracy 35 . Consistent with this 
orientation, the party entered into a coalition with the far-right (2006-10), earning a 
temporary suspension from the Party of European Socialists. Smer did seek to justify this 
coalition on both pragmatic (coalition stability) and political grounds, claiming that it was a 
means of taming the far-right. Yet the government’s subsequent passage of restrictive 
legislation (such as the 2009 Language Law) hinted at a closer affinity.  
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Post-1998 developments also highlighted how the ‘pro-Europe’ politics of anti-Mečiarism had 
obscured the illiberal nature of key parts of the pro-European center-right. In 2014 the 
opposition Christian Democrats (KDH) joined Smer in enacting a Constitutional ban on gay 
marriage36 and in 2015 supported the referendum initiative of the conservative Alliance for 
the Family seeking to ban same-sex marriage and adoption and the abolition of compulsory 
sex education. Small parties such as SaS and OLaNO were top-down creations, which either 
subordinated liberal social demands to pro-market economics and fiscal conservatism (SaS) 
or anti-political showmanship (OLaNO).  Even the protests of the Gorilla period which seemed 
to signal a reawakening of civic activism were inconclusive, leaving no lasting political effect 
and yielding only a semi-coherent anti-politics message directed against all parties and, to 
some extent, against the very notion of representative democracy.  
Poland 
Poland is seemingly the exception: a country that experienced sustained economic growth, 
bucked the Great Recession and produced, in Civic Platform, a strong liberal governing party 
and, in the upstart Palikot Movement which entered parliament in 2011, one of the few 
examples of an ECE protest party defined by radical social liberalism37. However, Poland’s 
status as a champion of liberalism – or a bulwark against illiberalism – may be more an 
expression of a party-electoral configuration than any deep-rooted cultural swing towards 
liberal norms. Firstly, like many pro-market liberal parties across the region Civic Platform 
pursues a narrowly defined technocratic, economically liberal, but socially conservative 
program. Moreover, in the words of one prominent observer of the Polish scene its ‘[n]ational 
and local elites are bound to Civic Platform primarily by the access that it provides to state 
patronage and the main factions are personality-based rather than ideological’.38  
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Secondly, notwithstanding its recent criticism of Viktor Orbán’s pro-Russian foreign policy, 
the long-term project of the conservative-national Law and Justice (PiS) party was one re-
founding Polish democracy by creating  a ‘Fourth Republic’ based on Catholic conservative 
values and an explicit rejection of the compromises of the transition settlement agreed 
between regime and opposition in 1989. PiS’s attempts to realize this project – most directly 
through minority governments in 2005-6 – floundered due to the party’s inability to expand 
its electoral base and the more proportional, power-dispersing nature of Poland’s political 
institutions. However, the dynamics, if not the final outcome, of Polish political competition 
in the early-mid 2000s, thus appear to run in parallel to those of Hungary, a point underlined 
by the early backsliding literature’s recognition of Poland as  the ‘capital of Central European 
illiberalism’.39  
According to our interpretation, Poland thus appears as a case of illiberal conservative 
nationalism held at bay with an outlook more pessimistic than the current political situation 
might imply. Poland remains a divided society in which liberal rights for constituencies such 
as sexual minorities and women are either opposed or only reluctantly tolerated by many.40 
There remain strong bases of conservative nationalism rooted in the continued importance 
of PiS and support for the positions of the Catholic Church that - with the exception of the 
declining Palikot Movement (now renamed Your Movement (TR)) - are still accommodated 
rather than opposed by the more liberal end of the political spectrum. Although the Catholic-
conservative right has rowed back on its earlier Fidesz-style project of cultural and 
constitutional transformation (‘Fourth Republic’), the key building blocks of illiberal 
consolidation are firmly in place. 
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Towards a Bulgarian Scenario for ECE? 
All of these societies fit the Bulgarian paradigm in several key regards: the policing of taboos 
on nationally-sensitive issues; incestuous and under-debated relationships between political 
and economic elites; and the predominance of narrow, economistic forms of liberalism.  Most 
significantly, however, the relative stability of these states since EU accession has been 
supplied not by the liberal institutions – or the after-effects of an EU enforced ‘liberal 
consensus’ - but by the relative absence of liberal challenges to illiberal power structures and 
norms. Bulgaria’s present, in which superficially liberal institutional forms mask the illiberal 
parameters constraining political and cultural change, may thus be the future equilibrium 
point for Central Europe.   
Such a prognosis might be unduly pessimistic. Liberal traditions, legacies of dissidence and 
civic activism are certainly stronger in, say, the Czech Republic and Poland than they have 
ever been in Bulgaria. Citizens and office-holders in Prague and Warsaw may recognize more 
readily that norms implied by labels such as ‘Europe’ and ‘democracy’ are incompatible with 
practices like the overt scapegoating of ethnic minorities or the blatant funding of police 
forces through private contributions. It is possible that some or all of these Central and (even) 
Southeast European societies may yet become functionally liberal democracies.  
However, we contend, they are not on course to do so while liberal accommodation of illiberal 
norms endures. In failing to confront the flawed designs of economic elites or to provide 
alternative identity projects to counter national and social conservatisms, ECE liberals have 
consistently opted to pretend they live in liberal societies, rather than setting out to make 
them so. We therefore need to reassess the contribution of those ‘liberals’ who are better at 
winning elections than being liberal. 
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This implies that the task at hand is not necessarily the rescue and reform of failing, de-
consolidating democratic experiments. Rather, the recent experience of East Central Europe 
suggests that the limits of what sound institutional planning can achieve in the absence of 
strong liberal civil societies has been reached. Liberal institutions can lock in norms supported 
by a liberal civil society by giving them legal force, but they can only temporarily substitute 
for a liberalism that is absent. That is the actual predicament of East Central Europe. The 
erosion and circumvention of institutions recorded by databases is not ‘democratic 
backsliding’ but rather a symptom of the interaction between democracies that were born 
hollow and a ‘liberal consensus’ that never was.  
Dangers of the Status quo 
What are the dangers of this “Bulgarian scenario”? Firstly, while avoiding Hungarian-style 
backsliding, it leaves hollow ECE democracies vulnerable to the breakdown of norms of 
democratic representation as the Potemkinesque character of mainstream parties and 
politicians (and anti-politicians and anti-parties) becomes apparent. This leads to a growing 
empowerment of elites despite formal structures of accountability and open competition. 
The populist ‘Elite versus People’ structuring of politics that Krastev saw in 2007 as the 
boisterous (but ultimately benign) future of European democracy exercises a corrosive effect 
in the born-hollow, ersatz-liberal democracies of ECE. Secondly, the capture of pro-European 
politics by ersatz liberalism inhibits the formation of the liberal (counter-) publics which could 
and should act as agents of the long-term cultural and identity change necessary for any 
progression towards a fully liberal democracy.  
Promoting liberal democracy means confronting illiberal norms  
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The “Bulgarian scenario” is not inevitable, either for Central European states, or indeed – in 
the longer term - for Bulgaria itself. But avoiding it may require a reorientation of research 
and policy agendas in the region. If there is one vital lesson to be learned, it is that even if 
liberal institutions are implemented and mainstream identities and policies proclaimed, 
strong, progressive liberal identities are unlikely to emerge without the active promotion of 
liberal ideals in politics and civil society. Without such identities it is difficult to understand on 
what grounds citizens might hold collusive elites to account when politicians tamper with 
electoral codes or scapegoat minorities. In much of ECE, liberal institutions paradoxically give 
legal force to norms that almost no one identifies with. In some cases, liberal rights are only 
upheld until that point at which some nationalist or conservative norm is challenged, and then 
lapse. 
Liberal politicians and civil society activists thus need to advocate liberal principles 
consistently, in particular in areas where they clash with existing illiberal norms. Often, this 
may mean actively confronting social constituencies such as nomenklatura-derived economic 
elites (often media owners, party backers), nationalist historical lobbies and powerful factions 
in institutions such as churches and armies. In the short term, rates of harassment would go 
up and Freedom House democracy scores, paradoxically, might go down. Yet the long path 
from a tacitly illiberal political culture to liberal pluralism is a long one. It is unlikely to be 
negotiated without conflict.  
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